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ESSAY
Article 32 Hearings:
A Road Map for Grand Jury Reform
CLAIRE P. DONOHUE*
INTRODUCTION
In late 2014, two grand juries, one in New York and one in Mis-
souri, declined to return indictments against white police officers,
Daniel Pantaleo and Darren Wilson, for killing unarmed black men,
Eric Garner and Michael Brown. Since that time, seemingly countless
accounts of police violence against black civilians have come to light.1
The racial overtones and implications for race relations between the
public and the police are obvious. What is equally obvious for many in
the legal community and beyond, is the need to renew calls for grand
jury reform.2 With the public on high alert, with people's confidence
in criminal justice system so low, with the accused being members of
the same executive branch that is obligated to examine the case,
surely the need for transparency of process is clear.3 California re-
cently addressed the quagmire by outlawing the use of grand juries in
* Director of the Domestic Violence Clinic, Practitioner in Residence at American Uni-
versity Washington College of Law.
1. See, e.g., In Depth: Protest over Police Violence, CBS NEWS, http://www.cbsnews.com/
feature/protests-over-police-violence (last updated Nov. 29, 2015) (referencing allegations in
Cleveland and Cincinnati, OH; Baltimore, MD; Waller County and Arlington, TX).
2. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz & Stephen E. Henderson, Reforming the Grand Jury to
Protect Privacy in Third Party Records, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 195, 197 (2014); The Editorial Board,
A Judge's Idea for Grand Jury Reform, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com
2015/02/19/opinion/a-judges-idea-for-grand-jury-reform.html.
3. See Tracy Kaplan, California Bans Grand Juries in Fatal Shootings by Police, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 15, 2015), http://www.mercurynews.com/crime-courts/ci-28621966/gov-
brown-oks-nations-lst-ban-grand-juries (stating that beyond the Ferguson and Staten Island
cases, "[c]alls for transparency also have come amid national concerns about disparate treatment
of blacks and other racial minorities when encounters with cops turned deadly in Baltimore,
Cincinnati and South Carolina").
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cases involving fatal shootings by police,4 but for those states that had
or have grand juries, the calls for transparency focus, by default, on
the ex poste release of grand jury transcripts. And indeed, in Fergu-
son Missouri, the grand jury transcripts were eventually released in
the name of transparency.5 Meanwhile the legal battle over the release
of records in the Daniel Pantaleo proceedings in New York waged on
for some time and resulted in only preliminary release of limited
information.6
Release of records in the Ferguson case revealed a process star-
tling to those with an insider's knowledge of the grand jury proceed-
ings. The breadth and detail of the evidence before the grand jury was
in stark contrast to the typical 'less is more' approach of prosecutors.'
Similarly, the preliminary release of limited information in New York
revealed a grand jury preceding that far and away exceeded the prac-
ticed norms.8 Many were left to conclude that the prosecutors in-
vested themselves in achieving no-bill decisions and that the grand
juries returned the decision that was expected of them, just as grand
juries typically return indictment after indictment, because prosecu-
tors request the indictments (never mind that the requests are often
based on nothing more than a second or third hand report by a gov-
ernment agent).
9
The stubborn insistence that grand jury secrecy protects civil lib-
erties seems amiss in the light of widespread public distrust of policing
and the criminal justice system.' ° And yet, even the release of records
in Missouri only provided an imperfect, incomplete solution: it is diffi-
4. Id.
5. But see Benjamin Weiser, Mixed Motives Seen in Prosecutor's Decision to Release Fergu-
son Grand Jury Materials, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/26/us/
mixed-motives-seen-in-prosecutors-decision-to-release-ferguson-grand-jury-materials.htm?-r=
(addressing "mixed motives" for the release of the grand jury transcripts).
6. Then, in March 2015, a judge decided that the grand jury transcripts would not be re-
leased. Associated Press, Judge Won't Release Grand Jury Testimony in Eric Garner's
Chokehold Death, Pix 11 (Mar. 20, 2015), http://pixll.com/2015103/19/judge-wont-release-nyc-
chokehold-death-grand-jury-testimony/.
7. See Niki Kuckes, The Useful, Dangerous Fiction of Grand Jury Independence, 41 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1, 13 (2004); see also Ferguson Grand Jury Transcripts Show Widely Varying
Witness Testimony, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ferguson-grand-
jury-transcripts-show-widely-varying-witness-testimony-1416948406.
8. Kuckes, supra note 7, at 13.
9. Id. at 21.
10. See, e.g., Sara Levy, The Patriot Act Grand Jury Disclosure Exception: A Proposal for
Reconciling Civil Liberty and Law Enforcement Concerns, 5 CHI.-KENT J. INT'L & COMP. L. 2,
section D (2005) (offering an overview of the policies underlying grand jury secrecy); see also
Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Door of American Grand Jury: Its History, Its Secrecy, and Its
Process, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1996) (discussing the history behind grand jury secrecy).
[VOL. 59:469
Article 32 Hearings
cult to fully contextualize or understand what was done when one
looks at one proceeding in a vacuum without access to other grand
jury transcripts. Moreover, ex-post access and transparency is just a
first step in inspiring the systemic reforms that would serve as a pro-
phylactic against inconsistent or biased grand jury procedures.
As scholars and practitioners continue to debate the shape and
form that grand jury reform might take, and specifically tackle the
question of whether or how grand juries might be more transparent,
they would be advised to consider the military counterpart to the
grand jury, namely Article 32 Investigations. Part I of this paper gives
a brief overview of the grand jury system as an "accusatory" body.
Part II describes Article 32 Investigations and Part III suggests grand
jury reforms for open hearings and defense participation that are in
line with aspects of Article 32 proceedings.
I. GRAND JURIES
As is the case with much of our jurisprudence, the United States
took its lead from English Common law in defining grand juries. In
18th century-England the grand jury sat "only to hear evidence on
behalf of the prosecution[,] for the finding of an indictment is only in
the nature of an enquiry or accusation, which is afterwards to be tried
and determined."" Accordingly, in early American courts the grand
jury was charged to examine "upon what foundation [the charge] is
made."'" "As a consequence, neither in this country nor in England
has the suspect under investigation by the grand jury ever been
thought to have a right to testify or to have exculpatory evidence
presented."' 3
In steadfastly holding that only a bare minimum is required for
grand jury examination of a charge, the court has not only declined to
extend technical evidentiary protections (e.g. protection against hear-
say evidence) to an accused, but has gone beyond this to afford grand
juries the same deference it offers prosecutors under their charging
11. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 300 (1769); 2 M.
HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 157 (1st Am. ed. 1847); see also United States v.
Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51 (1992).
12. Respublica v. Shaffer, 1 U.S. 236 (1788); see also Williams, 504 U.S. at 51 (discussing
history of grand juries); F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 360, pp. 248-249
(8th ed. 1880).
13. Williams, 504 U.S. at 51.
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powers. 4 In United States v. Costello, for example, the court did not
just rule that hearsay rules were inapplicable to grand juries, it held
more broadly that "[a]n indictment returned by a legally constituted
and unbiased grand jury, like an information drawn by the prosecutor,
if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the
merits. The Fifth Amendment requires nothing more."' 5
So while the Supreme Court tells us that the grand jury has an
historic role "as a protective bulwark standing solidly between the or-
dinary citizen and an overzealous prosecutor," 6 it also seems inclined
to conflate the roles of the grand jury with the role of the prosecutor.
Historically, for example, because the grand jury was essentially sign-
ing off on an allegation or certain set of allegations, the prosecution
was then required to try the exact charge returned by the grand jury.17
But modern rules and procedures have drifted even from this con-
straint. 8 In United States v. Miller, for example, the Court held that
Miller could be convicted of a different offense, one based on evi-
dence that was less than that put before the grand jury. The court
argued that the evidence before the grand jury was "surplusage."' 9
Indeed, "[1]eaving aside, for a moment, the Court's rhetoric suggesting
that the grand jury is a 'neutral' decisionmaker like a magistrate
judge, the vision of grand jury indictment that emerges from the
Court's decisions does not resemble a judicial process, but rather
prosecutorial decisionmaking. ' ' 20 In a very real sense the grand jury
has always been an "accusatory not adjudicatory" body.2 '
Increasingly, modern grand juries are convened and operated not
as an independent entity meant to test prosecutors, but rather as an
extension of that office.2 2 The courts continue to insist on the legal
fiction 3 of independence between grand juries and prosecutors even
as their opinions (essentially) reason that the grand jury has
14. Niki Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor: Explaining the Constitutional Function of the
Federal Grand Jury, 94 GEO L. J. 1265, 1305 (2006)
15. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 409 (1956).
16. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). Yet in that same case the court
acknowledges that the grand jury may not always serve that role.
17. ROBERT 0. DAWSON, DEORGE E. Dix, FRANK W. MILLER, & RAYMOND I. PARANAS,
PROSECUTION AND ADJUDICATION 695 (5th ed. 2000).
18. See id.
19. See id. at 696; see, e.g., United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 136 (1985).
20. See Kuckes, supra note 14, at 1305.
21. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51 (1992).
22. See Taslitz, supra note 2, at 207 (stating that nobody informs grand jurors of their full
power or independence).
23. See Kuckes, supra note 7.
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prosecutorial charging power, and they eradicate any difference of in-
stitutional perspective between the grand jury and the prosecutor.
Add to all of this, that the dance between prosecutors and grand juries
is almost entirely out of the public purview.24 Yet public outcry over
the Daniel Pantaleo and Darren Wilson grand juries show one very
real consequence of the lack of transparency and clear objectivity:
public distrust. Military Article 32 Investigations provide for proce-
dures that would remedy this public distrust, most notably: 1) the pub-
lic nature of the proceedings; and 2) the ability of the defense to be
present and participate meaningfully.
II. ARTICLE 32 INVESTIGATIONS
The right to grand juries as secured by the Fifth Amendment of
the constitution is inapplicable to the Armed Forces: "[n]o person
shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual
service in time of war or public danger. . ." (emphasis added).2 5 In-
stead the Uniform Code of Military Justice outlines a distinct process
known as Article 32 Investigations, often called an Article 32 Hear-
ing.26 An accused is entitled to an Article 32 Hearing, but may waive
the requirement.27 Article 32 Hearings are meant to be "thorough and
impartial" reviews of charges, before those charges are presented to a
general court martial.28 The purpose of the investigation is to provide
"inquiry as to the truth of the matter set forth in the charges, consider-
ation of the form of the charges, and a recommendation as to the dis-
position which should be made of the case in the interest of justice and
discipline. "
29
24. See, e.g., Mo REV. STAT. §§ 540.130.1; 540.310.1(2014) (provisions against disclosure).
25. U.S. CONST. AMEND. 5.
26. 10 U.S.C. § 832 (2012).
27. Id.
28. Id.; see also, e.g., Michelle Tan, Bergdahl Charged With Desertion, Faces Article 32,
ARMY TIMES (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.armytimes.com/story/military/2015/03/25/bowe-
bergdahl-army-decision-next-steps/70436058/; Andrew Tilgham, Army, Bergdalh Could Face
Court Martial, MILITARY TIMES (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/pen
tagon/2014/12/22/army-sgt-bowe-bergdahl-could-face-court-martial/
2 07 7 17 2 3 /.
29. 10 U.S.C. § 832 (2012).
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The requirement for formalized, thorough pretrial investigations
was first codified in the Articles of War in 1920.30 The statutory re-
quirement for Article 32 Hearings specifically followed two "substan-
tive legislative changes and was formalized in The Uniform Code for
Military Justice in 1958.31 From its earliest inception and until its rati-
fication, the proponents of Article 32 Hearings maintained that "the
armed services can point to [Article 32 Hearings] with pride as ex-
ceeding any comparable protection in civilian life."32
Article 32 Hearings are often compared to preliminary hearings
and grand juries proceedings, because it, like they, has a screening
function. The additional functions, of Article 32 Hearings, however,
highlight stark differences from grand jury proceedings, and differ-
ences from preliminary hearings as well.33 Article 32 Hearings serve
four purposes: 1) protect the accused from baseless charges; 2) pro-
vide the adjudicating body with evidence to determine whether to re-
fer the charges to trial by court martial; 3) provide the convening
authority with information to determine a range of dispositions for a
case being referred to trial by court martial; and 4) to provide the
defense with discovery.34 Notably, only the first three are statutory
purposes, and the latter, defense discovery, is a collateral, yet recog-
nized and protected interest.
35
As shall be discussed in more detail below, Article 32 Hearings
allow the defense to be present and participate meaningfully, includ-
ing by presenting evidence.36 Moreover, the proceedings supply the
convening authority with information concerning possible dispositions
and serve as a means of discovery for the defense.37 As such "it is far
30. Article of War 70, § 1, ch. 2, 41 Stat. 759, 802 (1920), as amended. See also 62 Stat. 604,
633, 639, 642 (1948); Lieutenannt Colonel William Murphy, The Formal Pretrial Investigation, 12
MIL. L. REV. 1, 1 (1961).
31. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-934 (1958); see also Murphy, supra note 30, at 1.
32. See Murphy, supra note 30, at 2.
33. "Insofar as the Article 32 investigation is an inquiry into the facts surrounding the
charges against the accused, and thus an important pretrial screening device, it is functionally
similar to both the preliminary hearing and grand jury. It is, however, a unique hybrid, and
dissimilar in large part to both civilian proceedings." Chapter 9 The Article 32 Investigation, 3,
Report of the Washington Headquarters Services, http://responsesystemspanel.whs.mil/Public/
docsfmeetings/Sub-Committee/20140107-CSS/Materials/MRE/CH9-Art32lnvestigations-2012
0418.pdf (2014) (hereinafter Chapter 9).
34. Chapter 9, supra note 33, at 1.
35. Major Larry A. Gaydos, Comprehensive Guide to Military Pretrial Investigation, 111
MIL. L. REV. 49 (1986).
36. Id.
37. Chapter 9, supra note 33, at 3.
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broader in scope than is the normal preliminary hearing."3 As com-
pared to the grand jury system: "the grand jury is a secret proceeding
that deprives a testifying accused [of various rights of confrontation].
Consequently, the Article 32 investigation is far more protective of
the accused than is any analogous civilian proceeding."39
There are important procedural safeguards for an accused in an
Article 32 Hearing. First, a prosecutor is not permitted to advise or
assist the judicial officer. In United State v. Payne, the court held that
ex parte conversations between the Article 32 Hearing investigating
officer and the prosecutor violated the investigator's role as a judicial
officer.40 The reasoning in Payne provides an important perspective
on Article 32 Hearings: the investigator, the juror if you will, is consid-
ered a judicial officer on the preceding who is adjudicating the "truth
of the matter set forth in the charges."'" It follows then that conversa-
tions with the investigator would be inappropriate ex parte communi-
cations.4a Contrast grand jury proceedings, where the prosecutor is
not only permitted, but often statutorily tasked,43 to work with jurors
as an "accusatory body." a44 Secondly, the defendant is present at the
Article 32 Hearing with a lawyer.4a While this is not unique to Article
32 Hearings alone and is, in fact, allowed by some states in grand jury
proceedings; the Article 32 Hearings take the presence of a repre-
sented defendant one step further by allowing the defense to cross
examine witnesses,46 call their own witnesses, and present their own
evidence. 47 Also, the defense is permitted to present argument to the
judicial officer about what charges may be appropriate or what poten-
tial dispositions, short of court martial,a8 may be appropriate.4 9
38. Id.
39. Id. at 3-4.
40. United States v. Payne, 3 M.J. 354, 356 (C.M.A. 1977) (holding, however, that the im-
propriety did not prejudice the appellant).
41. 10 U.S.C. § 832 (2012).
42. See Payne, 3 M.J. at 356.
43. Mo. REV. STAT. § 540.130 (2014) (stating "[w]henever required by any grand jury, it
shall be the duty of the prosecuting or circuit attorney in the county, or in a city not within a
county, to attend them for the purpose of examining witnesses in their presence, or giving them
advice upon any legal matter") (emphasis added).
44. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 37 (1992).
45. United States v. Mickel, 26 C.M.R. 104, 106 (C.M.A. 1958) (holding that failure to pro-
vide qualified counsel at an Article 32 Hearing constituted reversible error).
46. 10 U.S.C. § 832 (2012). The amendment.
47. 10 U.S.C. § 832 (2012). See generally United States. v. Ledbetter, 2 M.J. 37 (C.M.A.
1976) (discussing defendant's right to order appearance of a witness).
48. The equivalent of a bill or indictment.
49. 10 U.S.C. § 832 (2012) (amended section effective one year after December 26, 2013).
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There are also several important provisions to secure the integrity
and solemnity of the hearings. The hearings will follow an investiga-
tion by military law enforcement, a commander, or a regulatory inves-
tigation. 0 Secondly, the hearings are before a designated investigating
officer. This individual is selected and may serve on a temporary basis
or as a permanent installation.51 As of the most recent amendment,
the investigation officer must, barring exigencies, be a Judge Advo-
cate.52 Again, as with Payne, one can see the perspective that if an
Article 32 Hearing is to serve as a shield to false accusations or over
charges, then the investigator (the grand juror) must be fit to adjudi-
cate the matter before her. Moreover, the Article 32 Hearings are
open hearings, so public in fact, that when the press was denied access
to a hearing, ABC sued.53 ABC won the case, resulting in a proclama-
tion that: "[t]oday we make it clear that, absent 'cause shown that
outweighs the value of openness,' the military accused is likewise enti-
tled to a public Article 32 investigative hearing."54
III. ROADMAP FOR GRAND JURY REFORM
Many question whether the grand jury legitimately investigates
and screens pretrial matters or whether they serve as a rubber stamp
for a prosecutor's office. Indeed, the concerns are so fixed and long-
standing that even law school texts apprise aspiring attorneys of the
long list of "concerns that can be raised as to the ability of the grand
jury to function effectively [including] its dependence upon the prose-
cution for information, investigatory assistance, and legal advice, and
the potential difficulty which lay jurors may experience in resolving
the sometimes complex legal issues that even probable cause determi-
nations raise." 56 Many of the attributes of the Article 32 Hearing cor-
rect for these concerns. This is particularly true for cases such as
Brown and Garner, where there is an obvious critique that the needs
50. See, e.g. Tan, supra note, 28 (indicating that the "extensive" Army investigation into
Bergdahl's conduct lasted six months and was then "reviewed thoroughly" by a commanding
general before the matter was advanced to an Article 32 Hearing).
51. 10 U.S.C. § 832 (2012) (amended section effective one year after December 26, 2013.
52. Id.
53. ABC, Inc. v. Powell, 47 M.J. 363 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
54. Id. at 365. The ABC case was not extended to allow public access to documents filed in
a court martial. See Center for Constitutional Rights v. United States, 72 M.J. 126 (C.A.A.F.
2013).
55. See, e.g., Levy, supra note 10, at n.27 (offering scholarly accounts from as early as the
30s, 60s, and 70s, that characterize the grand jury system as a rubber stamp).
56. DAwsON ET AL., supra note 17, at 695.
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of certain types or classes of victims are undermined by an opaque,
prosecutor-driven, grand jury system.
It is also particularly logical to import aspects of the Article 32
Hearing into the grand jury system when one considers the potential
conflict of interest that a prosecutor's office faces in proceeding
against an officer who has been accused of a crime.57 When a prosecu-
tor is faced with a law enforcement officer having been accused of a
crime, they are faced with 'one of their own' having been accused of a
crime. This, no doubt, inspires any number of reactions ranging from
"no it can't be; not Officer so-and-so" to "we cannot have bad people
doing our good and important work." It is likely that this range of
reactions mirrors the reactions of military members faced with the re-
alization that 'one of their own' has been accused of a crime. Accusa-
tions are personal if they are made against someone that the
prosecutor or commander knows well, something that is incredibly
common at the county level or where a military outfit is working and/
or living closely with one another.58 Some accusations are vile, worri-
some, public relations nightmare.59 Some accusations are maddening
if they are for conduct that has been insidious and yet know within the
institutional walls.6" Whatever the reaction, accusations often hit close
to home and create a conflict of interest, one best managed with care
and transparency.
Article 32 Hearings provide a good example of a system that is
more even handed, and certainly more transparent, than the grand
jury system. The grand jury system as it operates in most states
amounts to one long ex parte conversation between the prosecutor
and the grand jury members; this fact is most acute where the defense
is not permitted in the proceedings.61 And even where the defense is
permitted to be present, they are not permitted to present evidence or
57. Local Criminal Prosecution, HUMAN RIGHTs WATCH (June 1998), http://www.hrw.org/
legacy/reports98/police/uspo3l.htm.
58. See id.
59. Sarah Hagen, Cop Accused of Sexually Assaulting a 2-year Old, USA TODAY (Mar. 20,
2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/03/19/police-childsex-assault/25041091/;
Kellan Howell, 13 Cops Indicted After Participating in Undercover Drug Trafficking Scheme,
WASH. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/apr/30/13-police-offi
cers-indicted-after-participating-in/.
60. Helene Cooper, Pentagon Study Finds 50% Increase in Reports of Military Sexual As-
saults, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/02/us/military-sex-assault-
report.html.
61. Taslitz & Henderson, supra note 2, at 207 (stating "social science research demonstrates
that an awareness that one will need to justify her actions to a third party reduces the chance of
error").
2016]
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cross examine witnesses. The portrayal of evidence in grand juries is
entirely one sided and therefore skewed. Prosecutors, for example,
can chose not to present exculpatory evidence, or they can choose to
present illegally obtained evidence.62 Prosecutors' decision to control
presentation of evidence in this way has an obvious result: in federal
cases, grand juries indict 99% of the cases before them.
63
That is, unless of course, the prosecution feels independently mo-
tivated to present evidence in favor of the defense as they notably did
in the Wilson (Ferguson) and Pantaleo (New York City) cases.64 The
trouble, of course, is that barring any prosecutorial misconduct, the
prosecution is not required to rebut itself and indeed, rarely does so.
65
This notion that the prosecution will pick and choose which cases re-
quire meritorious fleshing out and which cases only require a cursory
presentation of evidence is deeply offensive to notions of equal pro-
tection and due process. Several Article 32 Hearing-style reforms
would correct for these shortcomings in the grand jury system.
A. Open Hearings
The notion of open proceedings is logical given the myriad of
studies that affirm that decision making is improved when it is under-
taken in public view.6 6 In grand jury proceedings examining police
misconduct, one can easily see why scrutiny in public view makes
good sense. Under current laws and norms, the grand jury rubber
stamps the whims of the prosecution and, if forced to review the mat-
ter, the court rubber stamps the decisions of grand juries.6 7 The
robotic nature of grand jury indictments, coupled with secret proceed-
ings, has damaging social costs. 68 This is dramatically evident when
62. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 52 (1992) (allowing that prosecution need
not present exculpatory evidence and that illegally obtained evidence can come before the grand
jury); see also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 355 (1974) (declining to extend the pro-
tection of the exclusionary rule).
63. See Thaddeus Hoffmeister, The Grand Jury Legal Advisor: Resurrecting the Grand
Jury's Shield, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1776 (2008).
64. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, 'Continually Reminded of their Inferior Position': Social
Dominance, Implicit Bias, Criminality, and Race, 46 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 23, 113 (2014).
65. The prosecution could indict a ham sandwich. See Hoffmeister, supra note 53, at 1776
(2008); see also Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 409 (1956); Williams, 504 U.S. at 52.
66. See Taslitz & Henderson, supra note 2, at 204.
67. No judge is present during grand jury proceedings, disclosure of the proceedings is lim-
ited, and the grounds for challenging the outcome of grand juries are very narrow. See Costello,
350 U.S. at 409, FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 6(e); see also Taslitz & Henderson, supra note 2, at 208.
68. Id. at 219; Police Nationwide Brace for Protests After Ferguson, CBS NEWS (Nov. 14,
2014, 12:43 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ferguson-missouri-police-nationwide-brace-for-
protests-after-grand-jury-decision/.
[VOL. 59:469
Article 32 Hearings
there is an allegation of police misconduct. In such cases, the public
view can all too easily see that the system of rubber stamping seems to
rubber stamp police misconduct.69 Transparency seems particularly
important and obvious when it comes to scrutinizing police, because
as with any governmental agency that is allowed (indeed invited) to
exercise its will against citizens, public accountability is an important
restraint on that agency. 0
Beyond the desire for public accountability for police, is the sense
that public hearings would elevate public accountability for prosecu-
tors. Codified grand jury transparency, like the transparency required
in Article 32 Hearings, would produce a better result than the ad hoc,
reactionary transparency that follows public outcry. As stated earlier,
release of the transcripts in Ferguson and the limited release of docu-
ments in New York revealed a disconcerting approach: the prosecutor
had operated outside of institutional and legal norms and offered an
abundance of exculpatory evidence before the grand jury. 71 A grand
jury decision not to indict after such a robust presentation of evidence
might not have been so troubling if it were not for the fact that a
similarly measured presentation of evidence rarely seems available to
most defendants, notably men of color. Yet the ability of advocates to
make the equal protection arguments and due process objections in
the face of inconsistent practices is stymied by the fact that most grand
jury proceedings are in secret and seemingly judgment proof.72 How
then can there be any public accountability for the prosecution?
Lastly, the same studies that show public decision making reduces
the chance of poor decision making, would support the notion that
69. Grand jury secrecy is seen as part of the web of police secrecy. Al Baker & J. David
Goodman, New Challenges to Secrecy That Protects Police Files, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015), http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2015/02/05/nyregion/new-challenges-to-secrecy-that-protects-police-files.ht
ml.
70. See, e.g., Marianne F. Kies, Note, Policing the Police: Freedom of the Press, The Right to
Privacy, and Civilian Recordings of Police Activity, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 274, 301-02 (2011)
(discussing civilian recordings of police misconduct); see Charlotte Dennett, The Freedom of
Information Versus Government Secrecy: A Vermont Lawyer Sues the CIA, 31 VT. B.J. 20, 22
(2005) (discussing government secrecy and the Freedom of Information Act and stating the view
that "secrecy removes accountability"); Taslitz & Henderson, supra note 2, at 204.
71. See Hoffmeister, supra note 63, at 1209 (discussing "trial stage" protections regarding
exculpatory evidence and noting that "the prosecutor is not required to provide exculpatory
information to the grand jury and can obtain an indictment simply by relying on hearsay
statements").
72. See id. at 1196-97 (noting that "starting with Costello v. United States, [the courts] have
become increasingly reluctant to apply their supervisory power to activities occurring within the
grand jury room." And in recent years courts have "continued to limit the instances in which the
supervisory power could be employed in the context of grand juries").
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grand jurors should hear evidence and report their decision in public
view.73 Of course one wants to keep a grand jury free from public
opinion and pressures just as it wants to keep a petite jury free from
such pressures; and secret deliberations may make sense for grand ju-
ries just as it makes sense for petite juries.74 Requiring, however, that
the hearings themselves be secret seems inapposite to the suggestion
that grand juries should be free from control and manipulation, be-
cause the very secrecy of their proceedings makes them vulnerable to
pressure and control from the prosecution.75 The prosecutor is, after
all, the puppet master of the grand jury proceedings; she: directs the
order and manner of evidence; requests subpoenas and drafts charges;
convenes the grand jury and excuses them; and advises them through-
out.76 Open hearings would insure that the prosecutor tempers her
role with deliberation; and a sense that their proceedings are in public
view would encourage grand juries to be engaged, thoughtful recipi-
ents of evidence.
B. Defense Present & Participates
The fair and effective participation of a criminal defendant, as
permissible in Article 32 Hearings, would also address many aspects
of the public's frustration with the grand jury system. Procedural jus-
tice theory and the associated research makes the clear link between
participation and a sense of justice. Procedural justice is not a juris-
prudence that advocates from a procedural due process perspective,
rather it advocates a way of thinking about justice that "resolve[s]
conflicts in such a way as to bind up the social fabric and encourage
continuation of a productive exchange between individuals."77
73. See Taslitz & Henderson, supra note 2, at 204.
74. See Kadish, supra note 10, at 2; Levy, supra note 10.
75. See Hoffmeister, supra note 63 at 1198-99 (discussing how the court claims to be pro-
tecting grand jury independence "by both limiting and obfuscating the application of the supervi-
sory authority," but arguing that the court's decisions that "indirectly decreased grand juror
independence," because "there is little to prevent the executive branch from completely control-
ling the grand jury and usurping its powers").
76. See id. at 1183-84 (noting the role of the prosecutor as the director of the grand jury
proceeding, but also as the gatekeeper of information to the grand jury." "The prosecutor deter-
mines the order of the evidence, requests that the court issue subpoenas, questions the witnesses,
and drafts the charges. In addition, during their eighteen months of service, grand jurors meet at
the discretion of the prosecutor. Most importantly, at least for the purposes of this Article, the
prosecutor provides legal advice to the grand juror").
77. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 27 (1988).
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Procedural justice research indicates that people have a greater
sense that a given authority is "moral and legitimate" if the proce-
dures employed by that authority appear fair; for example: "allowing
a person to state their views, ensuring that their perspective is taken
seriously, and demonstrating that officials maintain an open mind
about this person and their case."78 This sense of participation and
fairness inspires a person's "sense of self-worth and, in turn, his de-
gree of compliance, even when [compliance] conflicts with immediate
self-interest. '79 As executed, grand juries are clearly not procedurally
fair from the defense perspective; but one wonders if, moreover, they
appear unfair from the public perceptive. Consider the aftermath of
the Michael Brown and Eric Garner cases and the public call for jus-
tice via a public vetting of the incidents in question.8" Arguably the
public's concerns could have been eliminated or at least assuaged if
the roles and procedures of those participating in the grand jury pro-
cess appeared clearly defined and logically fair.
Under current formations the prosecutor alone is allowed in the
room with grand juries to control the presentation of evidence and
moreover, to advise grand juries.8 When a prosecutor provides excul-
patory evidence, despite practice norms not to,82 a given defendant's
defense attorney might stand up and cheer, but the very inconsistency
of the practice is troubling to the legal community and the public gen-
erally. Now imagine if Darren Wilson and Daniel Pantaleo's defense
attorneys had been participating in the grand jury proceedings, as they
would have been in an Article 32 Hearing. Surely they would have
provided the rigorous defense of Wilson and Pantaleo that (instead)
the prosecutors did in these cases. Had the defense attorneys
presented evidence, cross examined witnesses, and otherwise
presented a defense, one could credit those efforts as being consistent
with the duty and role of a defense attorney. The public did not-could
not-credit the prosecutors for acting in a manner consistent with their
78. See Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State's Response to Domestic
Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843, 1846 (2002).
79. See id.
80. See, e.g., Greg Botelho, Michael Brown Shooting: What to Expect, What to Know as
Grand Jury Takes Place, CNN (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014108/20/justice/missouri-
shooting-grand-jury/index.html.
81. See, e.g., Mo REV. STAT. §540.130.1 (August 2014) (stating "[w]henever required by any
grand jury, it shall be the duty of the prosecuting or circuit attorney in the county, or in a city not
within a county, to attend them for the purpose of examining witnesses in their presence, or
giving them advice upon any legal matter").
82. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 52 (1992); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 355.
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roles when they acted as they did in the Wilson and Pantaleo grand
juries. Relatedly, having defense participation eliminates conflicts of
interest where the prosecutor is asked to present evidence against one
of "its own."
Allowing meaningful participation of defendants and defense
counsel in grand juries would visually and literally provide for the
presentation of two sides of a given event; thus it would affirm a sense
that a grand jury will and should have an open mind about a case
before them. Moreover, it would allow an individual defendant to feel
some sense of control and participation.83 A lack of control, in con-
trast, has been shown to cause emotional numbness; this numbness
can foreclose the possibility of meaningful healing or make an ulti-
mate victory seem hollow, because the passion for justice and closure
has been replaced by detachment.84 The fatigue and strain of emotion
laden litigation-particularly for the litigant, but for the public as
well-provides a breeding ground for self-doubt, and self-loathing.85
Control and participation go a long way to ward off these emotional
reactions to the stress and conflict inherent in litigation, which, in
turn, would increase the likelihood of parties' acceptance of the out-
come. 86 To the extent that members of the public identify with a given
defendant or victim, they might be vicariously affirmed by a grand
jury process that has a measured approach and clear roles. It would
follow then that the public's reactions would be less fraught and more
compliant if they could understand and credit the system.87
CONCLUSION
In the current climate, grand jury reform seems more appropriate
than ever to calm the rising tide of public distrust and the creeping
sense of the injustice of the status quo. Ham-sandwich indictments ap-
pear to be the norm for non-police offenders, with prosecutors suc-
83. See Epstein, supra note 78, 1877-78.
84. See Thomas Gutheil et al., , Preventing "Critogenic" Harms: Minimizing Emotional In-
jury From Civil Litigation, 28 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5, 11 (2000).
85. See id. The article cited here discusses the realities of this emotional fall out in the
context of civil litigation, yet one can imagine that the manifestations are only more extreme in
criminal context where the situation is so much more fraught. See, e.g., Abbe Smith, The Differ-
ence In Criminal Defense and the Difference it Makes, 11 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 83 (2003)
(discussing the difficulty of establishing a trusting attorney client relationship in the context of
the charged criminal litigation atmosphere).
86. See Epstein, supra note 78, at 1878, 1892.
87. See id.
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cessfully indicting the vast majority of the time.88 This is particularly
troubling for the African American community who suffer higher inci-
dents of arrests.89 In juxtaposition, there are the recent non-indict
ments of police offenders, which have led some to conclude that
excessive police force has been "effectively decriminalized. '"90 The
data suggests there is a problem. Public outcry suggests there is a
problem. The difficulty is in exploring or investigating the problem
when the grand jury process is shrouded in secrecy.
In contrast, several years ago in the course of its open and par-
ticipatory Article 32 Hearings, the press and some members of the
military began to notice that victims of sexual assault faired poorly
during the pretrial investigative system.91 Soon there was a rising con-
cern that victims of sexual assault, were marginalized or ignored by
the military justice system, possibly due to a conscious or subconscious
desire to turn a blind eye to the reality of sexual violence in the
ranks.92 The military began to investigate the problem and, thereafter,
undertook dramatic reform of its Article 32 Hearings. In answer, the
statue governing Article 32 Hearings was overhauled to speak to the
interest of the victims. Whereas at one time a commissioned officer
could have acted as the investigating officer for an Article 32 Hearing,
now the individual must be a lawyer.93 A sexual assault victim his or
88. See, e.g., MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., Federal
Justice Statistics Table (2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjsl0st.pdf (citing the statistic
that in 162,000 federal case grand juries only declined to indict 11 times).
89. See, e.g., BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., Felony
Defendant in Large Urban Counties, 2009 - Statistics Tables (2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf (2015) (stating "[b]lack males accounted for more than half (55%) of de-
fendants age 17 or younger. Among defendants age 40 or older, 37% were black males, 28%
were white males, and 16% were Hispanic males").
90. See Nicole Smith Furtell, The Cost of Silence: Rethinking Grand Jury Secrecy in cases of
Lethal Police Force, 2 WORKING PAPER (2015) (on file with the Author).
91. See, e.g., Ruth Marcus, In Navy Rape Case Defense Goes Wild, WASH. POST (Sept. 5,
2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opiions/ruth-marcus-in-navy-rape-case-defense-lawyers
-go-wild/2013/09/05/2c729520-1647-11e3-a2ec-b47e45e6f8ef-story.html; Twice Betrayed, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, http://www.mysanantonio.com/twice-betrayed (last visited Nov. 29,
2015); see also David Vergun, Legislation Changes UCMJ for Victims of Sexual Assault, U.S.
ARMY (Jan. 7,2015) http://www.army.mil/article/140807/Legislation-changes-UCMJ-for-victims
of sexualassault/.
92. LINDSAY ROSENTHAL & LAWRENCE KORB, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, Twice
Betrayed Bringing Justice to the U.S. Military's Sexual Assault Problem (Nov. 2013), https://
www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/
2
01
3
/11/MilitarySexualAssaultsReport.pdf; STE-
PHEN PRESTON, DEP'T OF DEF., The Military Justice System's Response to Unrestricted Reports of
Sexual Assault (Oct. 30, 2014) http://sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/FY14_POTUS/FY14_DoDRe
port-toPOTUSAnnex 4_OGC.pdf.
93. 10 U.S.C. § 832 (2012) (amended section effective one year after December 26, 2013).
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herself is represented by a lawyer.94 Also, a victim cannot be com-
pelled to testify and is now free to submit a sworn statement instead.95
The investigating officer must prepare a report concerning jurisdiction
and probable cause for charges as well as the "effect of evidence of
[an] uncharged offense.
96
Just as the military undertook change to protect a class of victims
previously not served well by its charging mechanisms, so too should
the civilian system consider reform. Leaving aside whether grand ju-
ries could or should ever be reformed to provide police-victims special
proceedings as sexual assault victims enjoy special proceedings in Ar-
ticle 32 Hearings, the civilian system should at least consider reform
that would increase transparency and clear division of roles. These as-
pects of the Article 32 Hearings are important procedural safeguards
for an accused and for victims. Moreover, the degree of equality and
transparency with Article 32 Hearings elevates the procedural justice
the proceeding provides.
The civilian system should be reformed to require open hearings.
It should also allow defense participation in order to delineate clear
roles that align with public expectations and address potential con-
flicts of interest. Such change seems long overdue. To ignore the need
for such changes seems not only unfair, but (nowadays) dangerous.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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